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One section of the [Kahan] report, known as Appendix B, was not pub-
lished at all, mainly for security reasons. That section contains the names 
of several intelligence agents referred to elsewhere in the report. Time has 
learned that it also contains further details about Sharon's visit to the 
Jemayel family on the day after Bashir Jemayel's assassination. Sharon 
reportedly told the Jemayels that the Israeli Army would be moving into 
West Beirut and that he expected the Christian forces to go into the Pales-
tinian refugee camps. Sharon also reportedly discussed with the Jemayels 
the need for the Phalangists to take revenge for the assassination of 
Bashir, but details of the conversation are not known. 1 
The publication of the above paragraph by Time magazine in Feb-
ruary, 1983, prompted Ariel Sharon, former Minister of Defence of 
Israel, to sue Time for libel in a New York Federal District Court. Time 
claimed its story was substantiated by confidential sources, Sharon's 
own testimony before the Kahan Commission, the disparity between 
the public portion of the Kahan Report and the Report's harsh findings 
against Sharon, and from other news reports claiming that Sharon had 
anticipated the massacres or intended for them to occur. 
On 16 September 1982, the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), occupying 
Beirut as a result of Israel's June invasion of Lebanon, permitted the 
Phalangists, a Lebanese Christian militias, to enter the Palestinian 
refugee camps of Sabra and Shatilla, purportedly to look for 2000 fight-
ers who allegedly stayed in the camps after the evacuation of the Pales-
tine Liberation Organization's (PLO) forces from Beirut. From approxi-
mately 6:00 p.m. 16 September until 8:00 a.m. 18 September, the 
Phalangists, and perhaps other militia, massacred unarmed men, 
women, and children living in these two camps. The exact number of 
victims cannot be determined but estimates range from roughly 300 to 
3000 people. 
The Israeli Cabinet established a commission of inquiry 2 pursuant 
to Israel's Commission of Inquiry Law 3 to investigate the Sabra and 
Shatilla massacres. 4 The Commission issued its report on 9 February 
1983. The Kahan Report refocused the controversy on the individual 
responsibility of many high ranking Israeli officials including former 
1. Time, Feb. 21, 1983, at 29. 
2. The Commission of Inquiry into the Events at the Refugee Camps in Beirut, 
1983: Final Report (Authorized Translation) in Jerusalem Post, Feb. 9, 1983 
(supplement) at 2. The Report may also be found in Int'l. Leg. Mat. at 473 (May 
1983). All references in this article are to the Feb. 9, 1983 Jerusalem Post 
(hereinafter "Kahan Report"). 
3. ld. 
4. Id. 
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Prime Minister Begin, Minister of Defence Sharon, and then Foreign 
Minister Shamir. s The Report was heralded, in part by the Commission 
itself, as a triumph of democracy and reaffirmation of the principles 
upon which Israel and other democratic nations were founded. 
Sharon, one of the most harshly criticized individuals in the Report, 
merely lost his cabinet portfolio for his responsibility in the massacres. 
Sharon was not among those who applauded the Report. He claimed 
that the Report had put the "Mark of Cain" upon him for finding that 
he should have known the Phalangists were liable to commit atrocities 
if sent into the refugee camps and for not having taken steps to prevent 
such atrocities from occurring. 6 Sharon was even less pleased with 
Time's coverage of the Report, and in particular, one paragraph that 
went beyond the scope of the Report. In that paragraph, Time stated 
that the unpublished Appendix B of the Report "contained further 
details" about a condolence visit Sharon made to the Jemayel family 
the day after the assassination of Bashir Jemayel, which was also the 
day before the Phalangists entered the refugee camps. The crucial, 
allegedly libellous statement was that "Sharon also reportedly discus-
sed with the J emayels the need for the Phalangists to take revenge for 
the assassination of Bashir, but the details of the conversation are not 
known". 7 
Sharon sued Time for 50 million dollars, charging libel. 8 He alleged 
that the statement went beyond the Kahan Report, which had found 
him indirectly responsible for the massacres, by suggesting that he 
actively encouraged revenge and, therefore, was directly responsible 
for the massacres, and that the statement was false. 9 He claimed that 
Time had published the statement with knowledge of or a reckless dis-
regard of its falsity. 
The case took approximately one year and cost about 3 million dol-
lars. At the end, the jury returned with a verdict that left both Sharon 
and Time claiming victory. The jury struggled with the complexities of 
Israeli politics, the invasion of Lebanon, and United States libel law, to 
5. Jerusalem Post Int'l., Feb. 13-19, 1983 at 1, cols. 1-2. 
6. Smolla, Suing the Press: Libel, The Media, and Power 81 (1986) (hereinafter 
"Smolla"), offers a more detailed analysis of Sharon vs Time, Inc. from the 
perspective of United States libel law. See also New Yorker, June 16, 1986, at 
42-83. 
7. Time, Feb. 21, 1983, at 29. 
8. N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1984, at B1, col4. 
9. Id. 
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discover the "truth" of Sharon's role in each. to Because of the 
intricacies of American libel law and the procedural framework for 
libel suits, the ultimate issue of Sharon's responsibility for the mas-
sacres was never resolved before the Federal District Court. 
Under international law the Kahan Report's distinction between 
direct and indirect responsibility for massacres of civilians is not recog-
nized. Of course, evaluation of that responsibility cannot be limited to 
the contents of Appendix B. 
This article will review in the facts and circumstances involved in 
the Sharon vs Time, Inc. case in Part I. Part IT will look to the Kahan 
Report's findings regarding the involvement of Sharon in the events 
surrounding the massacres at Sabra and Shatilla. Part ill will examine 
the Report and its delineation of direct and indirect responsibility for 
the massacres. The final section will deal with Sharon's responsibility 
for the massacres according to International Law. 
I. Sharon vs Time, Inc. 
The Sharon vs Time 11 trial was a detailed analysis of the intricacies 
of American libel law and provided a look at Sharon's participation in 
the events surrounding the massacres at the Sabra and Shatilla camps. 
Due to the structure of American libel law, the extent of Sharon's 
involvement in the massacres was never determined. The issues in the 
case were largely restricted to whether or not Appendix B substantiated 
Time's statement and whether the statement was defamatory by going 
beyond the findings of the Report. 
A. American Law of Libel 
In American libel law, the elements of a cause of action include: a 
statement of fact, that is false, and defamatory, of and concerning the 
10. N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1985, at 20, col. 6. The jury also had to act as linguistic 
experts. Sharon had testified before the Commission that he had discussed 
revenge "etslenu". The Hebrew word "etslenu'' may mean "among us" or "by 
us". A Hebrew language expert testified as to the possible meanings because 
Sharon said he meant to use the word in the sense of "among us" . that is, 
among the Israelis and not "by us"- that is, by Israelis with Phalangists. N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 3, 1985, at B3, col. 6. 
The primary reported decision in the Sharon case is the opinion denying 
Time's motion for summary judgment. Sharon vs Time, Inc., 599 F.Supp. 538 
(S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
11. Sharon vs Time, Inc., 599 F.Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
AA 
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plaintiff, that is published to a third party that causes actual injury and 
is the result of fault by the defendant. 12 As Time was a media defen-
dant, Sharon also had to prove that the false statement was published 
with knowledge of its falsity or a reckless disregard of its falsity. 13 This 
additional requirement saved Time from a determination that Sharon 
had been libeled. 
The jury, in Sharon vs Time, found that there was a defamatory state-
ment of fact of and concerning Sharon that was published and caused 
injury to the plaintiff and the jury found that the statement was false, 
at least based on the admissible evidence. The remaining element of 
demonstration of fault, that is "actual malice", a knowledge or reckless 
disregard of falsity, by Time was not proven by clear and convincing evi-
dence. 
B. The Testimony in Sharon vs Time 
The Sharon v. Time trial quickly settled into a contest between Sha-
ron and David Halevy, the reporter whose confidential sources resulted 
in the controversial paragraph. Sharon and Halevy presented equally 
detailed testimony. Sharon testified about his childhood and his politi-
cal and military careers. The trial became a forum for a re-evaluation of 
the war in Lebanon and the conclusions of the Kahan Report in order to 
remedy an aspiring politician's reputation as a decision maker. 
David Halevy's detailed testimony became a focus for re evaluation 
of the editorial process in media. Halevy, an Israeli, had served as an 
Israeli military officer. The events which led to Time's publication of 
12. Smolla, Law of Defamation 123 (1986). 
13. See, New York Times vs Sullivan, 376 U.S. 283 (1964). 
This case established a national standard that libel law in the U.S. is limited 
by the First Amendment of the Constitution provisions for a free press. Here, 
the New York Times was sued for libel by Sullivan, a Montgomery, Alabama 
police commissioner. He alleged that an advertisement run by "The Commit-
tee to Defend Martin Luther King and the Struggle for Freedom in the South", 
which spoke of the struggles of the civil rights movement in the South, had 
libelled him. The federal district court in Montgomery, a courtroom where sea-
ting was segregated and the judge spoke of "white man's justice," awarded 
Sullivan $500,000 in damages. Four years later the Supreme Court struck down 
the award, holding that before a media defendant can be found liable for defa· 
mation for a false defamatory statement the First Amendment, which protects 
freedom of speech and the press, requires that it be proven that the false state-
ment was published with knowledge of its falsity or a reckless disregard of its 
falsity. In other words, only if the media defendant knew the article was false, 
or was aware that it might be false and disregarded that risk, could the media 
defendant be found liable for defamation. 
45 
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the Sharon article began on December 6, 1982 when Halevy reported, 
based on three confidential sources (one of whom read him minutes of 
the condolence meeting over the phone) that Sharon "had given the 
Jemayel's the feeling" he understood the Phalangists' need for revenge 
during his condolence call to the Jemayels. 14 Halevy's three most 
important sources were General No.1, who told Halevy that notes 
existed of the Bikfaya meeting; Source A, an Israeli intelligence agent 
who read at least part of the notes to Halevy over the phone and said 
that the notes had been submitted to the Kahan Commission; and 
source C, who also read to Halevy from the notes. 
Halevy's testimony established the laxity of Time's editorial process. 
After the Kahan Report was published Harry Kelly, Time's Jerusalem 
Bureau Chief, asked Halevy if Appendix B would support the confiden-
tial source's information. 15 Halevy told Kelly "there is a case against 
General Sharon between the lines of the Kahan Report" and that "it is 
probably in Appendix B". 16 
Halevy never asked his confidential Source C if Appendix B actually 
said that Sharon had discussed revenge with the Jemayels. 17 Halevy 
testified that he went back to reread the Kahan Report to deduce what 
Appendix B said. 18 When Halevy returned to Kelly's office to respond 
to his question about whether the conversation was substantiated by 
Appendix B, he simply " ... raised my thumb in the kind of 'Okay', all 
cleared." 19 Although Source C never told Halevy or was ever asked if 
Appendix B said that Sharon had discussed revenge with the Jemayels, 
Halevy confirmed to Kelly that Appendix B did substantiate his story. 
Kelly testified that it was his impression that Halevy had seen notes 
of the condolence call from his confidential source. 20 After the press 
release on the story came out Ehud Olmert, a member of the Israeli 
Knesset, told Kelly he had seen Appendix B and it did not contain the 
information that Time's article claimed it did. 21 
14. Smolla, at 84. 
15. New Yorker, June 23, 1986, at 73. 
16. ld. at 85. 
17. Smolla, at 85. 
18. N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1984, at B1, col. 4. 
19. ld. at col. 5. 
20. Smolla, at 86. 
21. ld. at 86-87. 
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William Smith in New York wrote the Time story that incorporated 
Halevy's report. 22 Halevy used the language that Sharon "gave them 
the feeling ... ". 23 Smith changed the wording to "discussed with the 
Jemayels the need for ... revenge." 24 Compounding the problem, Time 
sent out a press release publicizing the article with the headline "Sha-
ron Said to Have Urged Lebanese to Send Phalangists into Camps." 25 
Just as the jury became intimately familiar with Sharon's career, 
lawyers for both sides explored exhaustively Halevy's journalistic 
career. It became clear that Halevy was deeply opposed to the war in 
Lebanon. Halevy had been in Beirut the day Jemayel was killed and he 
testified as to the atmosphere of revenge at Jemayel's funeral. Asked 
about his attitude towards Sharon, Halevy testified that Sharon "should 
have quit politics" 26 after the massacres: "The Kahan Commission 
practically fired him ... I think a public figure, once there is a verdict on 
a public figure, that public figure should hide, should stay away from 
politics." 27 He testified, "the occupation of the West Bank is corrupting 
my country, is corrupting my society. I am a great believer that occupa-
tion means corruption." 28 
Sharon's lawyers attempted to discredit Halevy as a biased reporter. 
They were able to show that he had been placed on probation for a year 
by Time for erroneous reporting. 29 
Time's editors and writers were closely questioned as to their under-
standing of the meaning of Sharon having discussed revenge with 
Phalangists. Time's managing editor Ray Cave testified he believed that 
the Kahan Commission knew that Sharon had discussed revenge with 
the Phalangists. 30 Although Cave testified that he believed Sharon was 
22. Id. at 86. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 86-87 (emphasis added). 
26. N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1984, at B2, col. 5. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1984, at B9, col. 1. In 1979 Halevy erroneously reported 
that Prime Minister Begin was in such ill health that he had been told by his 
doctors not to work more than three hours a day. Time's internal investigation 
concluded that Halevy was either "inexcusably shoddy in his reporting", had 
"intentionally misled" Time, or was "the victim of an incredibly well orches-
trated disinformation plot." Id. 
30. N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1984, at B4 col. 3. 
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responsible for the massacres, he would not say that he thought Sharon 
anticipated the killings or the article said or implied such anticipa-
tion. 31 
William Smith testified that Sharon had "allowed the Phalangists to 
go into the camps, and the result of that action was the murder of 700 or 
800 unarmed civilians", and that he understood the Commission had 
found Sharon "indirectly" responsible but refused to acknowledge that 
the article he wrote accused Sharon of direct responsibility. 32 
The essential element of proof was Appendix B which the Israeli 
government refused to release. In the final days of the trial, Judge 
Sofaer successfully negotiated a compromise agreement between Israel 
and the lawyers for Time and Sharon. Israeli lawyers for Time and Sha-
ron in Israel were permitted to read, in the presence of former Chief 
Justice Kahan, Appendix B, notes and testimony on the condolence visit 
of Sharon to the Jemayel family, notes and testimony on an earlier 
meeting between Sharon and Phalangist leaders in Beirut on 15 Sep-
tember, notes and testimony pertaining to a meeting between Sharon 
and Bashir Jemayel on 12 September, and all notes and testimony relat-
ing to any other meetings between Sharon and the Phalangists between 
14 and 16 September, after which Kahan would respond yes or no to 
three questions: 
Does the document contain any evidence or suggestion that 
Mr Sharon held a conversation with the Jemayel family, or any 
other Phalangist, in which he discussed the need to avenge the 
death of Bashir Jemayel? 
Does it contain any evidence or suggestion that any Phalan-
gist mentioned the need for revenge to Mr. Sharon? 
And does it contain any evidence or suggestion of whether 
Sharon knew in advance that Phalangists would massacre civi-
lians if they entered the refugee camps unaccompanied by 
Israeli troops? 33 
Justice Kahan replied: 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
In none of the documents or testimony is there any evidence or 
suggestion that Minister Sharon had a discussion with the 
Jemayel family or with any other Phalangist, at Bikfaya or 
33. N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1985, at A31, col. 6; N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1985, at A1, col. 4 
and B4, cols. 5-6; and New Yorker, June 23, 1986, at 77. 
AO 
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elsewhere, in which Minister Sharon discussed the need to 
avenge the death of Bashir Jemayel. 
In none of the documents or testimony is there any evidence 
or suggestion that Minister Sharon had a discussion with a 
Phalangist in which either person mentioned the need for 
revenge. 
There is no mention in the said documents or testimony of the 
possibility of the massacre taking place if Phalangists were 
allowed to enter the camps unaccompanied by IDF troops. 34 
Time objected that it had not been permitted to see all necessary 
documents. In its closing argument, Time conceded that the discussion 
of revenge did not appear in Appendix B, but reasserted that Time 
believed it was true when the article was published, that the rest of the 
article was true, and the magazine had properly relied on confidential 
sources. 35 
Judge Sofaer gave the jury three questions that had to be answered 
in the affirmative to find Time liable for defamation: a single negative 
answer would absolve Time of liability. 
The three questions were: If Mr Sharon has "proved by a preponder-
ance of the evidence" that the disputed paragraph defamed him by 
indicating that he "consciously intended" or "actively encouraged" the 
killing of civilians; second, if Mr Sharon proved defamation, has he 
"proved by clear and convincing evidence" that he did not discuss the 
need for the Phalangists to take revenge for the assassination of Bashir 
34. N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1985, at B4, cols. 5-6. 
35. N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1985, at B4, col. 1. A letter from Time's Israeli lawyers 
expressing reservations about the documents which had not been examined 
was read to the jury after the public and reporters were excluded from the 
courtroom pursuant to the negotiated settlement with Israel. Judge Sofaer 
stressed that he was seeking Israel's permission to release the letter. N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 11, 1985, at B4, cols. 1-2. The January 21 issue of Time released dur-
ing the jury's deliberations, stated that it 
now issues a correction: Appendix B does not contain further details about 
Sharon's visits to the Jemayel family. Time regrets that error. 
Time stands by the substance of the paragraph in question ... Time did not 
say, and has never said that Sharon intended the Phalangists commit a 
massacre, or encouraged such a massacre. 
The Israeli government continues to deny Time the right to inspect other 
specific testimony relevant to this case that is known to exist as part of the 
record of the commission of inquiry. 
Reprinted in N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1985, at B2, cols. 5-6. 
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Jemayel; and third, if Mr. Sharon proved defamation and falsity, has he 
also "proved by clear and convincing evidence" that someone at Time 
had published the article with actual malice, that is, with "knowledge 
that it was false," a "reckless disregard" of whether it was false, or with 
"serious doubts" about the truth of the false and defamatory statement 
when it was published. 36 
The jury decided for Sharon on the first two questions but after 
almost a week of deliberation they found for Time on the third crucial 
question. 37 The third question with which the jury had struggled is the 
constitutional standard of intent under New York Times Vs Sulli-
van 38 which must be demonstrated under American libel law to hold a 
media defendant responsible for libel. 
In a highly unusual procedure, after the verdict the jury's foreman 
read a statement that "We [the jury] find that certain Time employees, 
particulary correspondent David Halevy, acted negligently and 
carelessly in reporting and verifying the information which ultimately 
found its way into the published paragraph of interest in this 
case." 39 After announcement of the jury's verdict, Judge Sofaer asked 
everyone in the courtroom to stand in tribute to what was undeniably a 
textbooklike application of complex libel law to the facts of the Sharon 
case. 4° Both sides claimed victory. Time printed a retraction which in 
part, stated: 
[The libel suit] was brought by a foreign politician attempt-
ing to recoup his political fortunes. He could not sue Israel's 
Kahan Commission, which had found him guilty of indirect 
responsibility for the massacres at Sabra and Shatilla and 
recommended his ouster as Defence Minister. So he sued Time. 
Time's defence in this suit was severely hampered by the 
Israeli Government. That Government, citing security con-
36. N.Y. Times, Jan, 15, 1985, at B2, cols. 4-6. The jury instructions are reprinted 
in Libel in Trial: The Westmoreland and Sharon Cases, BNA Special Report, 
Appendix 4 (BNA 1985). 
37. N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1985, at A1, cols. 2-3 and B4, cols. 1-6. By answering no the 
jury also gave a negative answer to three supplementary questions that asked 
if Time "knowingly fabricated" information, "materially exaggerated" it or 
"disregarded substantial evidence of the probable falsity of the paragraph." 
N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1985, at A1, cols. 2-3. 
38. New York Times Co. vs Sullivan. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
39. N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1985, at A1, cols. 2-3. 
40. Smolla, at 92. 
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cerns, prevented key witnesses from testifying, threatened to 
prosecute them if they even talked with the magazine's attor-
neys and denied access to documents and testimony that Time 
felt would have proven its case. 41 
Sharon claimed "a great moral victory", the verdict having estab-
lished that Time's allegations were false, and the jerusalem Post, quoting 
Sharon's admirers, reported that he would be met in Israel with a 
"hero's welcome." 42 
Sharon vs Time was a public relations battle having little or nothing 
to do with determining Sharon's actual legal responsibility for the mas-
sacres. In a pre-trial opinion Judge Sofaer himself criticized Time for 
attempting to make the trial a public referendum on the war in Leba-
non. 43 
II. The Involvement of Sharon in the Massacres 
According to the Kahan Report. 
A. The Commission's Establishment, Terms of Reference 
and Authority. 
The Kahan Commission was established pursuant to Israel's Com-
mission of Inquiry Law. 44 The Israeli government is empowered by vir-
tue of this Law to set up a commission of inquiry whenever it appears 
"that a matter exists which is at the time of vital public importance and 
requires clarification, ... ". 45 The Law requires a commission of inquiry 
to sit in public unless it deems it necessary to conduct any hearing in 
41. N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1985, at B4, cols. 1·4. 
42. Smolla, at 92. 
43. Id. at 94. "Time seeks to litigate the entire history of the Lebanese civil war, the 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and the relationship of Israel and the Phalangists. 
These contents are far removed from the legitimate issues. They would be 
important if Time had merely stated in the article at issue that it thought that 
the Commission was involved in finding Minister Sharon not 'directly' respon-
sible an opinion for which Time in any event would have been immune from 
suit. But the jury may find that Time said something very different by report· 
ing that the Commission knew and withheld from the public details which 
could reasonably suggest that Minister Sharon condoned or encouraged the 
massacre as a measure of revenge". 
44. 23 Laws of the State of Israel ("LSI"), at 32 (1968) as amended in 26 LSI, at 31 
(1972). 
45. Article 1. 
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whole or in part in camera in the interest of protecting the "security of 
the State, safeguarding morality or safeguarding the welfare of a 
minor." 46 In accordance with Article 20(a) a commission may refrain 
from publishing portions of the report if necessary to protect, inter alia, 
the interest of national security. Article 15(a) requires the chairman of 
a commission, when it appears that a particular person is likely to be 
harmed by the inquiry or the results thereof, to notify that person in 
what respect he is likely to be harmed and to place at his disposal such 
evidence relevant to the potential harm as is in the possession of the 
commission or of a person authorized to collect materials for the com-
mission under Article 13. 
On 28 September, 1982 the Israeli Cabinet reluctantly resolved to 
establish a commission of inquiry when the Sabra and Shatilla mas-
sacres became a world-wide concern. The commission consisted of three 
members, Yitzhak Kahan, President of Israel's Supreme Court and 
Commission Chairman, Aharon Barak, Justice of the Supreme Court, 
and Yona Efrat, a reserve Major General in IDF. 47 
The Israeli Cabinet drew the terms of reference for the Commission. 
It was to examine "all the facts and factors connected with the atrocity 
[sic] carried out by a unit of the Lebanese Forces against the civilian 
population in the Shatilla and Sabra camps." 48 In spite of this quite 
limited scope of the inquiry, the Commission did in fact broaden its 
authorization by investigating whether it was indeed only a "unit of the 
Lebanese Forces" which perpetrated the massacres. However, the Com-
mission's factual inquiry was limited to the events of 16 to 18 Sep-
tember, 1982 the days on which the massacres occured. In delivering its 
functions, the Commission was further hampered in several respects. It 
visited Beirut but was not allowed to enter the area of the mas-
sacres. 49 The Commission published notices to the public inviting tes-
timony or any other information on the massacres; the response was 
however very limited. It also attempted to collect testimony from wit-
nesses outside its jurisdiction, but its requests "were not always hon-
oured." 50 
46. Article 18(a). 
47. Kahan Report at 1. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. See also Kapeliouk, Sabra and Shatilla: Inquiry Into a Massacre 81 (1984) 
(hereinafter "Sabra and Shatilla"). Kapeliouk expressed his belief that Arab 
witnesses (which would necessarily include many of the survivors) did not 
come forward to testify from a fear of retribution or an unwillingness to lend 
credence to the Commission's inquiry. 
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The Commission conceded "not a few contradictions" about the 
facts evolved from the testimony which were resolved "in accordance 
with the usual criteria in judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals," other-
wise left undefined. St It did not purport to resolve all such contradic-
tions, particularly those that "relate to the content of conversations 
that took place between various people without the presence of witnes-
ses, or when the witnesses' attention was not focused on the content of 
the conversation, and there are no exact notes on these conversa-
tions." 52 It further found such lapses in memory "only natural," claim-
ing no "need to rule about those contradictions which su~round unim-
portant details that do not influence the decision about points in con-
troversy". 53 Surprisingly, some of the conflicts which the Commission 
felt no need to resolve would appear to be not only significant but cru-
cial to determination of responsibility. 
The Commission, according to Article 20 of the Law, did not publish 
the notorious Appendix B of the Report to protect the "nation's security 
and foreign relations." It further issued, according to Article 15(a), a 
resolution pursuant to which notices of potential harm were sent to nine 
people - Prime Minister Menachem Begin, Foreign Minister Yitzhak 
Shamir, Minister of Defence Ariel Sharon, Chief of Staff Lieutenant 
General Rafael Eitan, Director of Military Intelligence Major General 
Yehoshua Saguy, the unnamed Head of the Institute for Intelligence 
and Special Projects (Mossad), G.O.C. Northern Command Major Gen-
eral Amir Drori, Division Commander Brigadier General Amos Yaron, 
and personal aide to the Minister of Defence Ariel Sharon, A vi 
Duda'i. 54 
B. Factual Background Leading Up to the Day 
the Massacres Began. 
It is important to state that the Commission was prudent in estab-
lishing the relationship between Israel and the Phalangists, and to point 
out the political motivations and attitude of the latter. The Phalangist's 
leaders, as the Commission noted, were of the opinion that "no unified 
51. Kahan Report at 3. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. For a critical appraisal of the Commission's limitations and functions see 
Schwarzenberger, Beirut 1982 -An Interdisciplinary Test Case, 38 The Year Book 
of World Affairs 295, at 301-303, 305 and passim (1984) (hereinafter "Schwar-
zenberger"). 
54. Kahan Report, at 3. 
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and independent Lebanese state could be established without a solu-
tion being found to the problem of the Palestinian refugees," 55 and 
that such solution was by "removing a large portion of [those) refugees 
from Lebanese soil, whether by methods of persuasion or other means 
of pressure." 56 The Phalangist leaders "did not conceal their opinion 
that it would be necessary to resort to acts of violence in order to cause 
the exodus of many Palestinian refugees from Lebanon." 57 
"In all the testimony" that the Commission heard, there was "unani-
mity" that the "battle ethics" of the Phalangists "differ greatly" from 
those of the IDF 58 The Mossad, the Israeli agency that was in charge of 
communications between the Phalangists and Israel, held that during 
the various meetings that took place with Bashir Jemayel "they heard 
things from him that left no room for doubt that the intention of this 
Phalangist leader was to eliminate the Palestinian problem in Lebanon 
when he came to power - even if that meant resorting to aberrant 
methods against the Palestinians in Lebanon." 59 The Commission 
reported that there were massacres committed by the Phalangists 
against women and children in Druze villages as well as the liquidation 
of Palestinians carried out by the Phalangist leader of the intelligence 
unit, Elie Hobeika. GO 
Israel's invasion of Lebanon began on 6 June 1982. 61 From 12 to 14 
June, IDF. forces took over the suburbs of Beirut and joined the Christ-
ian forces controlling East Beirut. 62 On 25 June the encirclement of 
West Beirut was completed and the PLO forces and Syrian troops were 
under siege. 63 It was a highly destructive war where the Israeli airforce 
and artillery played a major role in bombing and shelling West Beirut. 
On 19 August 1982, an agreement was reached for the evacuation of the 
PLO and Syrian forces from West Beirut, 64 an operation which was 
completed by 1 September 1982. On 23 August, Bashir Jemayel was 
55. Id. at 4. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. ld. Text in Journal of Palestine Studies, Nos. 44-45 (Summer/Fall1982), at 347. 
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elected president of Lebanon and he was due to assume his duties a 
month later. 
In the afternoon of 14 September 1982, a large explosion took place 
in the Phalangists headquarters where Bashir J emayel was meeting 
with Phalangist leaders and commanders. Israeli leaders came to know 
that Mr Jemayel was killed in that explosion at 11.00 p.m. of that day. It 
"was then that the decision was taken ... that the I.D.F would enter West 
Beirut." 65 The decision apparently was taken in a conversation bet-
ween the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence, Mr Sharon, and 
between the Prime Minister and the Chief of Staff. In one of the consul-
tations between Mr. Sharon and the Chief of Staff, there was mention of 
involving the Phalangists in their operations; but at that stage, such 
inclusion of the Phalangists was not mentioned to the Prime Minis-
ter. 66 
The operating order for the entry into West Beirut that would play a 
pivotal part in the ensuing massacres was Order number 6 to the IDF 
which provided in part: 
The refugee camps are not to be entered. Searching and mop-
ping up the camps will be done by the Phalangists/Lebanese 
Army. 67 
The same Order also stated that the Lebanese Army "is entitled to 
enter any place in Beirut, according to its request." 68 At this point, the 
events that would ultimately culminate in the massacres at the Sabra 
and Shatilla camps were set in motion. 
On 15 September 1982, the IDF entry into West Beirut 
began. 69 That same day between 8:00a.m. and 9:00 a.m. Sharon met at 
the forward command post with General Eitan, the Chief of Staff, who 
reported on his agreement with the Phalangists for their entry into the 
camps. 70 Sharon approved the agreement and phoned Prime Minister 
Begin from the roof of the command post. 71 According to the Report, 
Sharon only informed Begin that there was no resistance in Beirut and 
65. Kahan Report, at 5. 
66. I d. 
67. I d. 
68. I d. 
69. I d. 
70. I d. 
71. I d. 
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that the operations were going well. 72 Also present on the forward com-
mand post were the Defence Minister's aide Duda'i, the director of 
Military Intelligence Yehoshua Saguy, a representative of the Mossad, 
Major General Drori, and Brigadier General Yaron, among others. 
Duda'i's notes of the meeting stated that Phalangists were to be sent 
into the camps and that Sharon had spoken twice with the Prime Minis-
ter from the roof of the command post. 73 On 16 September, a document 
signed by Duda'i would be used by Sharon's office summarizing in two 
crucial and controversial sentences Sharon's instructions in this meet-
ing on the entry into West Beirut: "Only one element, and that is the 
IDF, shall command the forces in the area. For the operation in the 
camps the Phalangists should be sent in." 74 Sharon left the meeting for 
the Phalangist headquarters, along with the director of Military Intelli-
gence and representatives of Mossad. From this meeting Sharon left to 
pay a condolence call on the Jemayel family. 
After the condolence call, Sharon at 6:00p.m. spoke with Begin from 
his home, and reported that "everything is in order", and reconfirmed 
his approval of their decision to enter West Beirut. 75 According to the 
Report, there was no discussion of authorization of the Phalangists to 
enter the camps. 76 
C. The Massacres 
Thursday, 16 September 1982 was the day on which the massacres 
would begin. Eitan returned to Tel Aviv early that morning. 77 At 10:00 
a.m. Sharon met in his office with Eitan, among others. 78 Eitan 
announced 
72. 
73. 
74. 
75. 
76. 
77. 
78. 
79. 
the whole city is in our hands, complete quiet prevails now, the 
camps are closed and surrounded; the Phalangists are to go in at 
11:00-12:00. Yesterday we spoke to them ... The situation now is 
that the entire city is in our hands, the camps are all closed. 79 
Eitan stated that the Sabra and Shatilla camps were surrounded by 
I d. 
I d. 
Id. at 6. 
Id. at 5. 
Id. at 14. 
Id. at 5. 
I d. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
r-c 
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IDF forces and the Phalangists would go in when they wanted to go in 
after coordinating with the Israeli officials. 80 Sharon stated he "would 
send the Phalangists into the refugee camps." 81 During the meeting, 
Sharon telephoned Begin and informed him 
... the fighting has ended. The refugee camps are surrounded. 
The firing has stopped. We have not suffered any more casual-
ties. Everything is calm and quiet. Sitting opposite me is the 
Chief of Staff, who has just come from there [West Beirut]. All 
the key points are in our hands. Everything's over. I am bring-
ing the Chief of Staff to the Cabinet meeting. That's the situa-
tion as of now ... 82 
At approximately 6:00p.m. on Thursday, 16 September, the Phalan-
gists entered the camps. 83 As the first reports of the massacres were 
arriving at the Israeli command post in Beirut on 16 September, the 
Israeli Cabinet was meeting to discuss the situation in Lebanon after 
Jemayel's assassination. 84 Attending the meeting were the Prime 
Minister and the Cabinet Ministers, including Sharon, the Chief of 
Staff, the head of Mossad, and the director of Military Intelli-
gence. 85 The Chief of Staff, in describing his meetings with Phalangist 
personnel, said he had told the Phalangist commanders to go in where 
they were told, early that evening the Phalangists would begin fighting 
in Sabra, and that the Phalangists would go in there "with their own 
methods." 86 He described the camps as surrounded "by us," reiterated 
that the Phalangists would begin to "operate" that night in the camps, 
and said that "we could give them [the Phalangists] orders" whereas 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 56. 
83. Id. The Report at this point in its analysis, in a marked departure from its gen· 
erally unemotional tone, states that there were "armed terrorist forces" in the 
camps whose extent they could not establish but whose arms were being used 
against IDF. As noted in the Report, these hidden arms and terrorists never 
materialized. Kahan Report at 67. The Commission concludes that this ter-
rorist force had not been evacuated for two reasons: renewal of underground 
terrorist activity at a later period, and to protect the civilian population which 
had remained in the camps because given the hostility prevailing between the 
various sects and organizations, a population without armed protection was in 
danger of massacre. 
84. Id. at 7. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
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the Lebanese army was less malleable. 87 
Deputy Prime Minister Levy was the only person to question the 
Phalangists' entry into the camps. 88 No one responded to his expres-
sion of concern. 89 The Cabinet adopted a resolution which attributed 
the entry into West Beirut in part to the continued presence in Beirut of 
"some 2,000 terrorists, equipped with modern and heavy weapons ... in 
flagrant violation of the evacuation agreement ... ". 90 
During the night of Thursday and in the early morning of Friday as 
the massacres continued, the reports about civilian killings began to cir-
culate among the IDF officers at the forward command post. At 8:00 
a.m. on Friday, a highly respected Israeli journalist, Ze'ev Schiff, 
received a report from an undisclosed source in the General Staff in Tel 
Aviv that there was dab'h (Arabic for slaughter) going on in the 
camps. 91 At 11:00 a.m. Schiff met with Minister Zipori at the Minister's 
office to tell him about the report of "slaughter" in the camps he had 
received. 92 
From 6:00p.m. to 8:00p.m. on Friday, 17 September, unidentified 
Foreign Ministry personnel began receiving reports from unidentified 
United States representatives that "the Phalangists had been seen in 
the camps and that their presence was liable to lead to undesirable 
results - as well as complaints about actions by IDF soldiers in the hospi-
tal building in Beirut." 93 The Report says the Ministry saw to clarifica-
tion of the complaints and, according to the Report, the charges against 
the IDF soldiers were resolved to be "unfounded." 94 
Between 8:00p.m. and 9:00p.m. on Friday, Eitan returned to Israel 
and phoned Sharon to update him on the situation in Beirut. Sharon's 
testimony and Eitan's testimony on this conversation differ substan-
tially. Eitan testified that the Phalangists had carried out their opera-
tion and had stopped, and that they would leave by 5:00a.m. Saturday 
87. Id. After the massacres, Eitan told reporters: "We do not give the Phalangists 
orders and we are not responsible for them. The Phalangists are Lebanese and 
Lebanon is theirs and they act as they see fit." N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1983, at 6, 
col. 3. 
88. Kahan Report, at 7. 
89. I d. 
90. I d. 
91. Id. at 8. 
92. I d. 
93. ld. at 9. 
94. I d. 
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due to pressure from the United States. 95 He testified that he did not 
mention disorderly behaviour by the Phalangists, massacres or "killing 
beyond what had been expected." 96 In contrast, Sharon testified that 
Eitan had informed him that "the Christians had harmed the civilian 
population more than was expected." 97 He further testified that Eitan 
"used the expression that the Lebanese Forces had 'gone too far,' and 
that therefore their activity had been stopped in the afternoon, the 
entry of additional forces had been prevented, and an order had been 
given to the Phalangists to remove their forces from the camps by 5:00 
a.m. the following morning." 98 Sharon said that Eitan also mentioned 
that civilians had been killed; he claimed that was the first report of "ir-
regular activity" to reach him. 99 The Commission credited Sharon's 
version of the telephone conversation, concluding that from this point 
on he knew that killings of civilians had been carried out in the 
camps. 100 At 10:00 p.m. that evening Sharon also received from foreign 
ministry personnel a summary of complaints, lodged that evening by 
unidentified United States representatives, about the entry of the 
Phalangists into the camps and its potential consequences. 101 Finally, 
at 11:30 p.m., Mr Ben Yishai, the television military correspondent, cal-
led Sharon and told him of the reports he had heard that "the Phalan-
gists were doing unacceptable things in the camps." 102 Sharon did not 
react - by this time such reports were no longer news to him. 
In his first appearance before the Commission, Eitan testified that 
at about 10:00 a.m. on Saturday, 18 September, Begin had phoned to tell 
him that the Americans were complaining that the Phalangists had 
entered Gaza Hospital and were killing patients. 103 At Eitan's order 
the complaints were investigated, it was concluded there were no such 
killings, and he so informed the Prime Minister. Begin, however, had 
testified he was in a synagogue for Rosh Hashanah from 8:00 a.m. to 
1:15 p.m. 104 When the Commission pointed out Begin's testimony as to 
95. I d. 
96. I d. 
97. I d. 
98. I d. 
99. I d. 
100. I d. 
101. I d. 
102. I d. 
103. ld. at 10. 
104. I d. 
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his attendance at the synagogue to Eitan in his second appearance, 
Eitan said the phone call must have taken place earlier in the morn-
ing. 105 Begin denied the call altogether as well as any American call to 
him about Gaza Hospital. 106 Sharon, however, testified that Eitan had 
spoken to him by phone between 9:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. and had told 
him (Sharon) that Begin had called his attention to "some occurrence at 
Gaza Hospital." In an inexcusable failure to resolve these crucial con-
flicts in what Begin knew and when, the Report concluded there is "no 
need, for the purpose of determining the facts in this investigation, to 
decide between the conflicting versions ... " 107 
On Saturday morning, Sharon was receiving additional complaints 
about the slaughter. The Director-General of the Foreign Ministry, Mr 
Kimche, told Sharon that United States ambassador Draper had 
informed him that IDF soldiers had entered banks in Beirut and that 
Palestinians had been massacred. 108 Sharon's reply to Mr Kimche, 
given at approximately 1:00 p.m., was that the Phalangists' operation 
had been stopped and their forces expelled from the camps. 109 At 3:00 
p.m. on Saturday, Drori told Sharon about the reports of the massacre, 
that the Phalangists had left the camps, and that the press and Red 
Cross were inside the camps. 110 At 5:00 p.m. Drori appealed to the 
Lebanese army to enter the camps. 111 It finally agreed to do so bet-
ween 9:30 and 10:00 p.m. that evening but did not do so until Sunday, 
the following day. 112 
Having failed to address Begin's knowledge of trouble in the camps 
earlier that day, 113 the Report notes only that the Prime Minister 
"heard about the massacre" on a BBC radio broadcast that Saturday 
evening, at which point he contacted Eitan and Sharon. 114 The Report 
itself acknowledges that it is "ostensibly puzzling" 115 that Sharon did 
105. I d. 
106. I d. 
107. I d. 
108. I d. 
109. I d. 
110. I d. 
111. I d. 
112. I d. 
113. I d. 
114. I d. 
115. Id. at 15. 
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not inform Begin of the Phalangists' entry into the camps, and that 
Begin knew nothing of the plan until the Cabinet meeting on 16 Sep-
tember. 116 
At 9:00p.m. on Sunday, 19 September, a Cabinet meeting took place 
with the additional participation of Eitan, the head of the Mossad, the 
director of Military Intelligence Saguy, Major General Drori and other 
unnamed individuals. 117 In the course of that meeting Eitan stated: 
On Friday, I met with them [the Phalangists] at around 
noon, at their command post. We did not yet know what had 
happened there. In the morning we knew that they had killed 
civilians, so we ordered them to get out and we did not allow 
others to enter. But they did not say ... how many civilians they 
had killed; they did not say anything ... 118 
Eitan explained in his testimony that his knowledge of killings was 
on the morning of Saturday, not Friday morning. 119 The Commission 
accepted his explanation. 120 In the course of the meeting and the sub-
sequent testimony, Begin confirmed that on 14 September, when the 
decision to enter West Beirut was made, he had spoken to the Chief of 
Staff about protecting "the Muslims from the vengeance of the Phalan-
gists," 121 demonstrating their cognizance of the danger at that point in 
time. The Commission concluded that it could not determine "with cer-
tainty" what Begin had said at that time on this point. 122 The meeting 
resulted in a resolution expressing regret at the massacre "at a place 
distant from an I.D.F. position," and concluding: 
No one will preach to us moral values or respect for human life, 
on whose basis we were educated and will continue to educate 
generations of fighters in Israel. 123 
It will never be known exactly who or how many were killed. The 
official burial of the dead was done by the Red Cross which counted 328 
bodies, while the number given by the IDF intelligence sources is 
116. Id. at 14. 
117. Id. at 10. 
118. I d. 
119. I d. 
120. I d. 
121. I d. 
122. Id. at 11. 
123. I d. 
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between 700 and 800 victims. 124 
III The Report's Delineation of "Direct and Indirect" 
Responsibility for the Massacres. 
The Commission devised two levels of responsibility direct and 
indirect. 125 Those directly responsible were only those who "actually 
perpetrated" the massacre itself. 126 Therefore, it was relatively simple 
for the Commission to determine that Israel was not directly responsi-
ble for the massacres and it concluded that "the atrocities in the 
refugee camps were perpetrated by members of the Phalangists, and 
that absolutely no direct responsibility devolves upon Israel or upon 
those who acted in its behalf." 127 · 
A. Responsibility of Israel and its Officials. 
If, as the Report states, the Israeli officials planned and aided the 
Phalangists in the entry into the camps, and the Israeli officials knew or 
should have known that the massacres were likely to result and were 
occurring, then why was Israel not directly responsible? The Commis-
sion stated there was no direct responsibility because the Israeli offi-
cials did not allow the Phalangists to enter the camps with the intent 
that a massacre occur or as a plan with the Phalangists for a massacre 
to take place. 128 The Commission concludes that allowing the Phalan-
gists to enter the camps was made to avoid additional casualties in the 
IDF forces and to exploit the Phalangists' expertise in identifying "ter-
rorists." 129 Others have made a convincing argument that there was 
such a plan and intent. 130 The Commission also concludes, in a highly 
124. Id. at 10. 
125. Id. at 11. For a critical evaluation of the issue of direct and indirect responsibil-
ity, see Green, War Crimes, Extradition and Command Responsibility, 14 Isr. 
Y.B.H.R. 17, at 39 and passim (1984) (hereinafter "Green"). 
126. Kahan Report, at 11. 
127. Id. at 13. 
128. Id. at 12. 
129. Id. One article noted that the plan for the Phalangists to enter the camps "fits 
the objectives of [Sharon] who was reported early in the war to have hoped 
that the Phalangists, known for their ruthlessness, would go into West Beirut 
against the PLO, thereby sparing the Israeli army heavy casualties." N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 20, 1982, at 8, cols. 4-5. 
130. Jansen, Battle of Beirut: Why Israel Invaded Lebanon at 107-109 (1985) suggests 
that the massacres, if not their precise extent, may have been planned to 
C.'"J 
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questionable factual finding that nothing was visible or audible 
from the roof of the forward command post to indicate a massacre 
was taking place. 131 Therefore, the only forces found directly 
responsible were the Phalangists. 132 
Chief of Staff Eitan was reprimanded, as was Sharon, for the 
decision to have the Phalangists enter the camps, again with the 
suggestion that a massacre was anticipated: 
[It] is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Chief of Staff 
ignored this danger [to the civilian population] out of an aware-
ness that there were great advantages to sending the Phalan-
gists into the camps, and perhaps also out of a hope that in the 
final analysis, the Phalangist excesses would not be on a large 
scale. 133 
The Report does conclude that Israel and Israeli officials were indi-
rectly responsible for the massacres: 
... [T]he decision on the entry of the Phalangists into the 
refugee camps was taken without consideration of the danger -
which the makers and executors of the decision were obligated 
to foresee as probable -that the Phalangists would commit mas-
sacres and pogroms against the inhabitants of the camps, and 
without an examination of the means for preventing this 
danger. Similarly, it is clear from the course of events that 
when the reports began to arrive about the actions of the 
Phalangists in the camps, no proper heed was taken of these 
reports, the correct conclusions were not drawn from them, and 
no energetic and immediate actions were taken to restrain the 
Phalangists and put a stop to their actions. This both reflects 
promote an exodus of Palestinians from Lebanon (hereinafter "Jansen"). See 
also N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1982, at 10, cols. 4-5. Other sources have suggested 
that the underlying purpose of the invasion from its inception was to destroy 
the PLO in order to facilitate the annexation of the occupied territories. See, 
e.g., Boyle, International Law and Organization as an Approach to Conflict Resolu-
tion in the Middle East 7 (1983) (hereinafter "Boyle"). 
131. Kahan Report at 12. That finding so crucial to the Report's approach and so 
soundly rejected by most authorities, is a regrettable weakness in the Report 
that to a large extent undermines its fundamental premises and validity. 
132. Id. at 12. 
133. Id. at 16 (emphasis added). During the Sharon trial, an Israeli Army Reserve 
major, Nahum Menachem, testified that only four days before the massacres 
he warned Sharon that there was likely to be a slaughter among the factions in 
Lebanon, but Sharon had said there was nothing to worry about. Menachem 
had previously given the same testimony to the Kahan Commission. 
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and exhausts Israel's indirect responsibility for what occured 
in the refugee camps. 134 
In the section on individual personal responsibility, the Kahan 
Report concluded that Begin, Sharon, Shamir, Eitan, Saguy, Drori, the 
head of Mossad, and Yaron, should have known of the likelihood of a 
massacre, and either failed to prevent the entry of the Phalangists into 
the camps, and/or failed to take steps to restrain the Phalangists once 
the massacres had begun and information to that effect was 
received. 135 
B. The Findings as to Sharon's Responsibility 
The notice of harm sent to Sharon stated that he might be harmed if 
the Commission determined that he ignored or disregarded the danger 
of acts of revenge or bloodshed perpetrated by Lebanese forces against 
the population of the refugee camps in Beirut, and did not order the 
adoption of the withdrawal of the Lebanese forces from the refugee 
camps as quickly as possible and the adoption of measures to protect 
the population in the camps when information reached him about the 
acts of killing or excesses that were perpetrated by the Lebanese forces. 
The Commission found it "impossible to justify" 136 Sharon's disregard 
of the danger of a massacre, particularly after Bashir Jemayel's assassi-
nation, remarking that the likelihood of the Phalangists committing 
atrocities "did not concern him in the least." 137 
The Commission came very close to suggesting that Sharon sent in 
the Phalangists anticipating a massacre: 
H in fact the Defence Minister, when he decided that the 
Phalangists would enter the camps without the I.D.F. taking 
part in the operation, did not think that that the decision could 
bring about the very disaster that in fact occurred, the only pos-
sible explanation for this is that he disregarded any apprehen-
sions about what was to be expected because the advantages 
[to reduce the I.D.F. casualties, to involve the Phalangists in 
the fighting, and to discover terrorists] to be gained from the 
Phalangists' entry into the camps distracted him from the 
134. ld. at 13. 
135. ld. at 13-20. At the conclusion of its determination, the Report made only "re-
commendations" of certain measures to be taken against the eight faulted indi-
viduals. 
136. ld. at 15. 
137. ld. 
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proper consideration in this instance. 138 
Sharon was severely censured for failing to impose any checks on 
the Phalangists, but not for his failure to halt their operations - because 
the Commission had found that Sharon learned of the killings Friday 
evening and was told that the Phalangists would be out by the next 
morning. 139 
The Report concluded as to Sharon: 
We have found, as has been detailed in the report, that the 
Minister of Defence bears personal responsibility. In our opin-
ion, it is fitting that the Minister of Defence draw the approp-
riate personal conclusions arising out of the defects revealed 
with regard to the manner in which he discharged the duties of 
his office- and if necessary, that the Prime Minister consider 
whether he should exercise his authority under Section 21- A 
(a) of the Basic Law: the Government, according to which "the 
Prime Minister may, after informing the Cabinet of his inten-
tion to do so, remove a minister from office." 140 
IV. Sharon's Responsibility for the Massacres 
Under International Law. 
For the nine Israeli officials to whom the Commission sent notices of 
harm, including and particularly Ariel Sharon, their legal responsibility 
for the civilian massacres in Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps could be 
determined in the light of the relevant principles of international law. 
A. The International Law Criteria- The Nuremberg Principles. 
At the close of the Second World War, the four major allied powers 
drafted the Charter of the International Military Tribunal. 
("IMT"). 141 The Charter was applied by the Tribunal in the trial of the 
major German defendants. It provided for the individual criminal 
responsibility in cases of committing crimes against peace, war crimes 
or crimes against humanity. These principles of customary interna-
tional law were affirmed by the United Nations General 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
140. ld. at 22. 
141. 1 I.M.T. at 10-16. 
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Assembly. 142 It is important to point out that in the Eichman 
case, 143 Israel's High Court applied these principles with full recogni-
tion that they constitute an integral part of customary international 
law. 
Article 6(a) of the Nuremberg Principles defines "crime against 
peace" to include "planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war 
of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements 
or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the 
accomplishment of any of the foregoing." Article 6(b) defines the term 
"war crimes" to mean "violations of the laws or customs of war" which 
include "murder [and] ill treatment .. of civilian population of or in 
occupied territory, ... not justified by military necessity." Article 6(c) 
defines "crimes against humanity" to include "murder, extermination ... 
and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population ... ". 
The same article provides that "leaders, organizers, instigators, and 
accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a common 
plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsi-
ble for all acts performed by persons in execution of such plan." 
The Israeli invasion of Lebanon was a violation of customary inter-
national law, the U.N. Charter and several resolutions on aggression 
pursuant to the U.N. Charter. Specifically, Israel's invasion of Lebanon 
was a war of aggression, not self-defence. Articles 2(3) and 33 of the 
Charter, binding on Israel as a member of the United Nations and bind-
ing as customary international law, requires members to settle interna-
tional disputes by peaceful means. Article 2( 4) prohibits member states 
from using force against the "territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of any state ... ". There are only six instances in which the use of 
force is justified under the Charter, 144 none of which is applicable to 
142. G.A. Res. 95 (1) U.N. Doc. A/64/Add, 1 (1946). 
143. Eichmann vs Attorney General of the Government of Israel [1961]36 Int'l. L.R. 
227 (1962). 
144. There are rights of individual and collective self-defence in the event of an 
"armed attack" as prescribed by article 51; chapter 7 "enforcement action" by 
the appropriate regional organizations acting with the authorization of the Sec-
urity Council as required by article 53; the peacekeeping operations under the 
jurisdiction of the Security Council pursuant to chapter 6 or under the jurisdic-
tion of the General Assembly pursuant to the Uniting for Peace Resolution, 
G.A. Res. 377, 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) at 10, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950), or 
by a regional organization under the supervision of the Security Council pur-
suant to chapter 8 and articles 24 and 25. Boyle, at 4. 
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Israel's invasion of Lebanon. 145 
Moreover, even if the invasion could be viewed as an exercise of self-
defence, it would go beyond the parameters of permissible self-defence 
in its failure to be proportional to the triggering aggression. 146 From 
the cease-fire on 24 July 1981 until the June 1982 invasion, Israel 
claimed before the Security Council that the PLO had claimed seven-
teen victims. 147 It has been estimated that as many as twelve to fifteen 
thousand civilians died in Lebanon as a result of Israel's invasion. 148 
The leaders, organizers and other Israeli officials who acted to for-
mulate and execute the invasion are responsible for all acts performed 
by any persons in the execution of the invasion under Article 6 of the 
Nuremberg Principles. From the Kahan Report and other source mate-
rial it is clear that the Phalangists' entry into and their "mopping up" of 
the camps were viewed as an integral and necessary part of the invasion 
of Lebanon from its inception, 149 for which these Israeli officials are 
responsible under the said Article 6(a). Sharon himself insisted on the 
entry into the camps was necessary to rid them of 2000 "ter-
rorists", 150 although these terrorists failed to materialize. 151 
Aside from their responsibility for the massacres predicted on the 
illegal invasion, the individuals sent notices of harm by the Commission 
(with only the possible exceptions of the head of Mossad and Duda'i 
. whom the Commission absolved) would be responsible for war crimes 
against humanity given the findings of the Report. Under customary 
international law, an official or commander who has actual knowledge, 
145. Mallison & Mallison, Anned Conflict in Lebanon, 1982: Humanitarian Law in a 
Real World Setting, at 21-22 (1983) (hereinafter "Mallison & Mallison"). The 
authors demonstrated the failure of Israel to meet the legal requirement of 
exhausting peaceful procedures. The authors further argue at Id. 22-29 the fai-
lure of Israel to fulfil the legal requirements of necessity and proportionality 
in the "armed conflict" situation. 
146. Id. at 22-29. 
147. Id. at 23. 
148. Jansen, at 25. 
149. Kahan Report, at 12; see also N.Y. Times Sept. 26, 1982, at 6. The New York 
Times reported that during the second week of the war Sharon was considering 
sending the Phalangists into Shatilla, Sabra, and Fakhani in West Beirut. N.Y. 
Times, Oct. 20, 1982, at 6, col. 5. Sharon testified before the Commission that 
there had been a "longstanding Cabinet decision taken early in the war" to 
involve the Phalangists in the fighting to diminish IDF casualties. 
150. The Times (London), Sept. 29, 1982, at 8, cols. 2-5. 
151. See, Kahan Report, at 6-7. 
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or should have knowledge, through reports received by him or through 
other means, that troops or other persons subject to his control are 
about to commit or have commited war crimes and fails to take the 
necessary and reasonable steps to insure compliance with the law of 
war is responsible for such crimes. 152 The Kahan Report found that " ... 
if in fact the Defence Minister, when he decided that the Phalangists 
would enter the camps without the IDF taking part in the operation, did 
not think that the decision could bring about the very disaster that in 
fact occurred, the only possible explanation for this is that he disre-
garded any apprehensions about what was to be expected because the 
advantages ... distracted him ... " 153 Thus, the Report suggests that he 
was aware a massacre might occur but "disregarded" that risk and, 
therefore, acted recklessly or, at the least, negligently, in sending the 
Phalangists into the camps. 
B. The International Law Criteria - The Genocide Convention. 
The question has also been raised whether Israeli involvement in 
the massacres constitutes genocide. 154 The Convention on the Preven-
tion and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was drafted following 
the Second World War to outlaw the Nazi government's atrocities com-
mitted on the basis of national, ethnic, racial or religious identification 
and to prevent the occurance of such atrocities. It was appproved by the 
U.N. General Assembly and entered into force on 12 January, 
1951. 155 Israel is a party of that Convention, and it had enacted an 
Israeli Law that basically followed the tenet of the Convention. 156 The 
International Court of Justice stated in its Advisory Opinion that under 
the Convention "the Contracting States do not have any interest of 
their own; they merely have, one and all, a common interest," namely 
152. Application of Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946). Yamashita was tried by a special 
military commission for massacres of civilian population in the Philippines -
the gist of the charge being his failure as army commander to control his com-
mand and thereby allowing them to commit the alleged atrocities; see also U.S. 
Army Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, paragraph 501, at 178-79 
(1956). 
153. Kahan Report at 15. 
154. Mallison & Mallison, at 73. 
155. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
78 U.N.T.S. 277 (hereinafter "Genocide Convention"), was adopted unanim-
ously by the General Assembly on Dec. 9 1948. 3 U.N. GAOR, Part I, Annex, p. 
494, Doc. A/760 (1948). 
156. See, The Crime of Genocide (Prevention and Punishment) Law, 1950 at 4 LSI, 
at 101 (1950); See also Schwarzenberger, at 317-318. 
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the achievement of the Convention objectives. 157 
The pivotal substantive provisions are contained in Articles II, III 
and IV of the Genocide Convention. The Convention follows the basic 
tenet of criminal law in that there must be both an act, or an omission 
to act where there is a legal duty to do so, and the requisite intent, for 
criminal liability. 158 To establish liability for genocide under the Con-
vention, therefore, there must be one of the prohibited acts and the "in-
tent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religi-
ous group ... ". 159 Article IV of the Genocide Convention states that per-
sons committing genocide or any of the other acts under Article III 
"shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rul-
ers, public officials or private individuals." 160 
The unresolved issue is whether a party's reckless indifference to 
the likelihood of a massacre of the Palestinians is sufficient intent for 
liability, or whether it is necessary that the party's actions were taken 
with the intent that a massacre of the Palestinians would occur. By anal-
ogy to American criminal law, in the second case there would be the 
requisite intent for international murder, whereas in the first there 
would be reckless or grossly negligent homicide. Given the severity and 
seriousness of the crime of genocide, and the Convention's explicit 
emphasis on intent, it is submitted that recklessness or gross negligence 
would not be sufficient intent. The requisite intent should be intent to 
kill (or intent to seriously harm) Palestinians as such, even if the pre-
cise degree of harm or extent of killing was not specifically antici-
pated. 161 Even if intent in its strictest sense is required, it should be 
pointed out by analogy to American criminal law that proof of the con-
sequences which may be reasonably anticipated from a party's actions 
can be circumstantial evidence of a party's actual intent. 162 Therefore, 
the Report's conclusion that some of the nine named individuals, 
including Sharon, knew or should have known a massacre would take 
place, or that it was taking place, may be evidence of their actual intent 
157. Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, (1951) I.C.J. Reps. 23. 
158. Lafave & Scott, Criminal Law 175-77 (1972). 
159. Genocide Convention, Art. II. 
160. See the persuasive arguments on this issue advanced by Mallison & Mallison at 
74. 
161. This section does not address the broader issue of whether the invasion itself 
and other acts pursuant to the invasion were acts of genocide. 
162. See generally Sohn & Buergenthal, International Protection of Human Rights, 
913-992 (1973) (sources noting the high standard of proof for intent under the 
Convention). 
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for a massacre to occur or continue. 
The Commission did find that the IDF entered West Beirut only to 
restore order after Bashir Jemayel's assassination. 163 Yet the Commis-
sion was less charitable in its determination of the intent of Sharon in 
sending the Phalangists into the camps. The Report suggests that Sha-
ron not only should have been aware that a massacre might occur, but 
that he consciously regarded the risk of a massacre occurring. 164 By 
analogy to American criminal law and assuming that actual intent must 
be demonstrated, Sharon would only be responsible for genocide if it 
could be demonstrated that it was his conscious object that a massacre 
occur or if he was aware that a massacre was practically certain to 
occur. 165 
The use of terms such as "purifying and purging," 166 "mopping 
up," 167 and "cleaning up" 168 the camps does not reflect favourably on 
the Israeli officials' and commanders' actual intent. Indeed, the Report 
of an international commission into Israel's violations of international 
law during the invasion unanimously concluded: 
The massacres that took place at Sabra and Shatilla in Sep-
tember 1982 can be described as genocidal massacres, and the 
term "complicity in genocide" is wide enough to establish the 
responsibility of Israel for these acts." 169 
163. Kahan Report, at 12. 
164. Id. at 15; see also Green at 41-42, 45. 
165. See, e.g. Model Penal Code 202(2) (ALI 1985). 
166. N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1982, at 6, col. 4; Wash Post, Sept. 21, 1982, at A14, col. 6. 
167. N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1982, at 8, col. 4. 
168. N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1982, at 6, col. 5; N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1982, at 8, col. 6; 
N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1982, at 11, col. 2. Similarly, extensive bombing of the 
Palestinian camps and their bulldozing (see Mallison & Mallison at 61-64; Jan· 
sen at 15-39) may be circumstantial evidence of an intent to drive the Palesti-
nians, not merely Palestinian "terrorists,'' out of Lebanon. The Report states 
only that West Beirut was "occasionally shelled and bombed" by Israeli forces. 
Kahan Report, at 4. 
169. Israel in Lebanon Report of the International Commission to Enquire into 
Reported Violations of International Law by Israel during its Invasion of Lebanon 
196 (1983). The Commission was chaired by Sean MacBride, former Irish 
Foreign Minister, former United Nations Commissioner for Namibia and Nobel 
Peace Prize winner in 1974. Four of the Commission's six members concluded 
that Israel embarked on "deliberate destruction· of the national and cultural 
rights and identity of the Palestinian people amounting to genocide." The 
other two took the view that "while Israeli policy and practices in Lebanon are 
a violation of international humanitarian law, they do not amount to the crime 
of genocide." 
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C. The International Law Criteria- The Laws of War 
The international law principles governing the laws of war are 
mainly codified in the Hague Convention of 1907 Respecting the Laws 
and Customs of War on Land 170 and the Fourth Geneva Convention for 
the Protection of Civilian Persons of 1949. 171 Both documents set forth 
inter alia the duties of an occupier towards the public of an occupied 
territory. The Hague Convention, a multilateral treaty, was generally 
recognized as customary international law binding on all nations by the 
Nuremberg Tribunal172 and has been so recognized by the Supreme 
Court of Israel in the Elon Moreh case. 173 Article 43 requires an occupy-
ing power to take all measures in its power to restore and ensure public 
order and safety. According to Article 42 of the Convention, territory is 
considered occupied when it is "actually placed" under the authority of 
the hostile army, the occupation extending only to the territory where 
such authority has been established and can be exercised. 
Israel has signed and ratified all the Geneva Conventions. 174 The 
Fourth Convention embodies the principles of belligerent occupation 
relating to the status of the civilian population in areas under military 
occupation as a result of war. It applies in all cases of partial or total 
occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party. 175 The Fourth 
Convention has expanded the scope of the Hague Convention for the 
protection of civilians living in occupied territories. Article 27 of the 
Convention established the principle of respect for and the inviolable 
character of individual human rights. It states that "Protected persons 
are entitled, in all circumstances to respect for their persons, their hon-
our, their family rights, ... They shall at all times be humanely treated 
and shall be protected against all acts of violence ... " Article 32 specifi-
cally provides for the prohibition of any party to take "any measure of 
such a character as to cause the physical suffering or extermination of 
protected persons" whether such measures are applied by "civilian or 
military agents." 
Israel under the Fourth Geneva Convention and the 1907 Hague 
170. 36 U.S. Stat. 2277. 
171. 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
172. See 1 I.M.T. 171 at 254 (1947). 
173. See text in I Pal. Y.B. Int'l. L. 134 (1984). See, also, Id. at 164. 
17 4. See Boyd, the Applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the Occupied Ter-
ritories, 1 Isr. Y.B.H.R. 258 (1971); Schwarzenberger, at 318 and note 89 
thereof. 
175. See Mallison & Mallison, at 54-66. 
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Convention had an affirmative duty to protect the civilian population in 
the occupied refugee camps. Israel's occupation of West Beirut satisfied 
this standard as both Sharon and Eitan declared on 16 September 1982, 
that all of Beirut was under Israeli control. Yet, it failed to do so. Its fai-
lure to provide protection could be conceptualized as direct and public 
incitement to commit genocide, complicity in genocide or conspiracy to 
commit genocide. There was, at the least, a clear failure to stop the 
Phalangists immediately once the killing was known to Israeli officials, 
particularly General Sharon. 
V. Conclusion: "Finding the Truth, 
the Whole Truth, and Nothing But the Truth" 
Here is what we know after Sharon vs Time and the Kahan Report: 
Justice Kahan stated that in none of the documents or testimony was 
there any evidence or suggestion that Sharon had discussed revenge 
with any Phalangist or that there was any mention of the possibility of 
the massacre taking place. The jury concluded that: (1) the statement 
implied that Sharon "consciously intended" for a massacre to take 
place; (2) that Sharon did not in fact discuss revenge with the Phalan-
gists; and (3) that Time should have known that the statement was false 
but did not. Halevy reached his conclusion, that Sharon had discussed 
revenge and that this was substantiated in Appendix B, based primarily 
on what he perceived as a disparity between the factual findings of Sha-
ron's involvement according to the Report and the severity of the 
Report's conclusions on Sharon's "indirect" responsibility. The Kahan 
Report found that Sharon was aware of a substantial risk that a mas-
sacre might occur, but disregarded that risk and sent the Phalangists 
into the camps. 
What we do not know is the elusive "truth." Did Sharon discuss 
revenge with Phalangists, or know that a massacre would occur? The 
truth or falsity of the factual assertion that Sharon discussed revenge 
with Phalangists or knew that a massacre might occur and thereby 
intended for it to occur, was determined from those documents which 
Justice Kahan examined, upon which his conclusions were drawn, and 
Sharon's own testimony. 
Regardless of whether or not Halevy deduced the truth about Sha-
ron's responsibility for the massacres, that truth could not be 
documented. In the most emotional part of his testimony, Halevy spoke 
of his disappointment with his boyhood hero, his outrage at Jewish ter-
rorism in the West Bank, 176 and the tragedy of the war in 
176. For Jewish terrorism in the Occupied Territories, see The Karp Report in I Pal. 
Y.B. Int'l. L. at 185-217. 
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Lebanon. In his closing argument, Time's lawyer quoted Sharon as say-
ing his suit was the way he was "going to wash [his] hands clean of this 
terrible mess." 177 Sharon vs Time was a public opinion battle Sharon 
desperately needed to win. Oddly enough, it was not a struggle to regain 
public acceptance in Israel. Despite some debate, the unity government 
led by Shamir and Peres had paid for the airfare and hotel expenses of 
Sharon and his wife as though he were on official business in his new 
role as Minister of Industry and Trade, because neither Shamir or Peres 
could risk the fragile unity of the coalition government. 178 Time paid 
some of Sharon's legal fees. 179 The actual battle was to regain the pub-
lic acceptance necessary for his future political career in the opinion of 
Israel's strongest ally, the United States. The lawsuit was Ariel Sharon's 
opportunity to remove the cloud of "indirect responsibility" attributed 
to him for the Sabra and Shatilla massacres in the Kahan Commission 
Report. 
Mter the Kahan Report, Sharon was reported to have "lashed out" 
at the governing Herut party for denying him a portfolio in the newly 
formed government of Shamir. 18° Shimon Peres was particularly out-
spoken in his demands for the resignation of Begin and Sharon for 
Israeli involvement in the massacres. 181 He also called for Sharon's res-
ignation for sending the army into West Beirut without Cabinet 
approval. 182 Sharon's explanations to the Israeli Knesset had only 
increased the demand for an investigation and caused outrage at Sha-
ron's conduct before the Knesset. In the course of his presentation Sha-
ron had implied that, when Shimon Peres was Defence Minister, Israeli 
forces had been involved in the massacre of "thousands" at the Tell 
Zaatar refugee camp in Lebanon in 1976. 183 
177. N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1985, at B4, col. 2. 
178. N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1984, at B9, cols. 2-5. 
179. New Yorker, June 23, 1986, at 82. The one million dollars in legal expenses 
were defrayed by contributions from Sharon supporters in the United States 
and overseas, with a partner at the law firm employed by Sharon, and a former 
official of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai Brith, raising more than 
$350,000 from private donors. N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1985, at B4, col. 6. 
180. N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1984, at A3, col. 1. 
181. N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1982, at 1, cols. 2, 4 & 5; N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1982, at 1, 
col. 3. 
182. Id. 
183. N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1982, at 8, col. 2; see also Salpeter,A Soldier's Record: Will 
Sharon Survive? 20 The New Leader 6·7 (Nov. 1, 1982) Sharon has said that as 
long as he continued to have ''some influence," he would continue to serve in 
the government. To quote Jonathan Randal, senior foreign correspondent of 
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Sharon had called Time's report "blood libel," 184 but the blood 
that had been spilled was that of unarmed men, women and chil-
dren in Lebanon. In an article expressing outrage at Sharon's use 
of the term, Amos Perlmutter contended: 
Mr Sharon is thus wrapping himself in the flag of Israel and 
Judaism, not to make a moral point but to protect his scarred 
reputation and resurrect his political career. In charging Time 
with blood libel, he is playing upon the Jewish people's historic 
anxieties about their relations with Christians - exploiting cen-
turies of tragedy and misunderstanding to serve his personal 
ambition. 185 
the Washington Post: 
The main culprit, Ariel Sharon, neatly dodged the spirit if not the letter of the 
108 page report enjoining him to resign. Resign he did as Defence Minister, 
only to stay on as minister without portfolio and to join two key parliamentary 
commissions, on defence and Lebanese affairs. Sharon made clear this was his, 
and Begin's, way of rejecting the commission's verdict of Israel's "indirect 
responsibility" for the slaughter. 
Randal, Going All the Way: Christian Warlords, Israeli Adventures, and the War 
in Lebanon, 289 (1983). 
184. Smolla, at 82. 
185. N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1984, at A31, cols. 1-2. 
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